ABSTRACT As many services have been subcontracted to the cloud, data in such services (i.e., management applications, signal processing, and so on) are stored on cloud in encrypted form for protecting user private information. In many emerging data and signal processing applications, approximate k-nearest neighbor (ANN) query is a prerequisite component for massive high-dimensional data (such as time series, biometric, signal, multimedia data, and so on). Unfortunately, existing secure ANN (SANN) methods encounter the limitation of dimensionality. To further resolve ANN query over high-dimensionally encrypted data, in this paper, we propose an effective SANN model in Euclidean space. In overview, a secure greedy partition method is carefully designed by applying locality sensitive hashing coding and an optimized linear order. Based on that, a novel partition-based SANN (SANN P ) and a multi-division version mSANN P resolve SANN query by sequentially scanning a candidate set, which is produced by matching a cloak query with a map index. Our proposed solutions guarantee security and accuracy simultaneously, and reduce communication cost significantly. Meanwhile, the greedy partition method is proved to be indistinguishable secure under chosen-plaintext attack, which is the foundation of security for the proposed solutions. Through extensive experimental studies on four data sets, the proposed mechanisms outperform the state-of-the-art approaches and provide effective and tradeoff between result accuracy and communication cost.
paper, we propose a novel SANN solution in Euclidean space, named partition-based SANN (SANN P ) model. The contributions of this work are as follows:
• A delicate partition method is the kernel in SANN model. We design a secure greedy partition method by carefully levering locality sensitive hashing function and an optimized linear order. In the method, neighboring objects are gathered with a great probability, which steadies the accuracy of ANN query result.
• We present a pair of novel SANN models, SANN P and multi-division SANN P (mSANN P ), based on the new-defined greedy partition method. Both models are proved secure in the sense of IND-CPA with respect to a single query.
• Experimental studies are conducted over real and synthetic datasets. The results show that our work exhibits better performance comparing with three other state-ofthe-art SANN approaches in aspects of response time and result accuracy.
A. APPLICATION SCENARIOS
Many emerging database applications (e.g., time series, biometric and scientific databases) in the cloud are performing k-nearest neighbor (kNN) over high-dimensional data. For instance, in medical institutions, an ordinary task may always be performed as follows. A new patient's electrocardiogram (ECG) may be submitted as a query, in order to find the most similar patients in existing medical records for diagnostics. Feature vectors extracted from ECGs are always represented as vectors in high-dimensional Euclidean space for recognition, search, etc. [4] . Similarly, for a given query, in biometric information retrieval systems which outsource existing biological information to the cloud, the kNN result should be returned. In such cases as well as content based retrieval systems in multimedia databases, the queries and data are often represented as high-dimensional data. In these applications, a query itself may be approximate (caused by damage, missing, etc.) or the kNN result should be approximate for practical consideration. Formally, let D = {x i |x i ∈ R d ∧1 ≤ i ≤ n D } be the dataset, where d is the dimensionality and n D = #(D) is the cardinality of D. We denote by q as the query, SD i ⊆ D as the subset and ⊆ D as the candidate set which contains ANN result corresponding to q. For ease of illustration, we use the notations in Table 1 . The elements of the dataset are vectors, which are denoted with lowercase letters in bold.
Similar to [1] , participants in SANN are also defined as three entities as shown in Fig. 1 . 1) Owner owns the dataset, preprocesses the original data and outsources the preprocessed encrypted subsets to the cloud server. 2) Client, which may not necessarily be the Owner, is authorized to conduct a cloak query T by singleround interaction with the cloud server.
3) Cloud server (Server for short) holds dataset from
Owner and looks up the subset with T . Notably, within the framework in Fig. 1 , both query q and dataset D contain confidential information. Before D is encrypted, it is divided into several subsets SD i where ∪SD i = D. A map index I for subsets is generated off-line. Then, SD i is encrypted under Owner's secret key sk with an indistinguishability under chosen-plaintext attack (IND-CPA) secure encryption algorithm, and is allocated a unique tag. All subsets with their own unique tags are outsourced to Server. Secret key sk and map index I are sent to Client in a secure channel (such as SSL). 1 Client generates cloak query T in order to find subset(s) in which the close vectors of q falls with a sufficiently large probability. T is sent to Server instead of original q. Finally, Server returns the candidate set whose unique tags match T . When Client receives a response, he decrypts the candidate set and find the ANN result from it. In fact, we find kNNs over the decrypted subsets, and the kNNs are the ANN result of the whole dataset D.
B. OVERALL COMPARISONS
In our SANN P , Server is assumed to be semi-honest. We aim to prevent a semi-honest cloud from acquiring either the 1 How to assure the security in transmission channel is beyond the scope of this paper, we assume the key and map index can be transmitted in a secure way. data or the query. A summary of related works is elaborated in Table 2 . The leakage of encrypted matrix in [15] leads to fragile security because the secret key can be derived by linear resolution. Hence, Zhu et al. [15] declared that the proposed scheme can only provide data privacy and resolve the key sharing problem which is outside this paper. Other schemes also leaks information of encrypted data. RS-SANN in [14] adopts a weak security assumption (i.e., IND-OCPA) to construct a concrete SANN scheme. However, the ordering of encrypted compound LSH values are leaked, which may lead to potential security risk. Oppositely, we avoid information leakage in our proposed schemes and prove the security based on IND-CPA, which is indeed essential for practical consideration.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, formulations and definitions of SANN P are stated in detail. Greedy partition method is presented in Section III. Afterwards, we propose SANN P model in Section IV, and analyze SANN P in the viewpoints of security, accuracy and complexity. In Section V, we design an extended version mSANN P which promotes the result accuracy. The experiments are conducted in Section VI. Section VII reviews the related work. Finally, we conclude this work in Section VIII.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
A formal definition of SANN P is presented at the beginning. Besides, the challenges of designing SANN P for highdimensional data are described in detail. Afterwards, security requirements for SANN P are formally defined.
A. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Definition 1 (Partition-Based SANN): An SANN P includes the following four algorithms: 1) Preparation: Given the whole dataset D and a secret key sk, D is partitioned into several subsets SD 1 , SD 2 , . . . , SD nop , each of which is associated with a unique random tag t i ∈ Z. A map index I is generated to store the map between subsets and their associated tags. The encrypted outsourced subset is E( SD i ) = E(SD i ), t i where E(SD i ) is the encrypted form of SD i under sk. 2) QueryTag: Given a query q and the map index I , generate a cloak query T . 3) Search@Server: Given a cloak query T , answer the query by returning the set E( ) = {E( SD i )|t i ∈ T }. 4) Search@Client: Given E( ), q and a secret key sk, decrypt E( ) into and perform kNN search over it. In SANN P , only encrypted subsets and corresponding tags are subcontracted to Server. Notice that q cannot be directly derived by T and nobody can decrypt the dataset without Owner's secret key, so confidentiality is both guaranteed for q and D.
B. CHALLENGES
The first key problem of SANN P is to partition original dataset into several subsets in Preparation.
For NN search in one-dimensional data, the partition method was proposed in [1] (as shown in Fig. 2 ). The partition line is the perpendicular bisector between two adjacent critical vectors. However, it is infeasible for high-dimensional data because of the absence of linear order relation between data. Another natural way is to partition original data by clustering method [19] . However, there are three main limitations for the high-dimensional data: 1) it is intractable to cluster massive data [20] ; 2) simply clustering cannot guarantee that each cluster has the similar size, which may lead to data leakage; 3) there is no guarantee for search result accuracy. Hence, clustering cannot be applied in our problem.
For avoiding the leakage of query itself, original query cannot be transmitted from Client to Server in a public channel. Hence, a cloak query should be transmitted instead. For a semi-honest Server, it can only carry out Search@Server with the cloak query.
Based on above considerations, SANN P must resolve the following challenges:
1) How to partition the whole dataset into subsets and establish a map index? (Section III-C) 2) How to generate cloak query according to the map index? (Section IV-A)
C. SECURITY REQUIREMENT
Aside from the aforementioned challenges, as an SANN scheme, SANN P needs to be secure enough. In this part, we emphasize that the proposed partition method has to satisfy security in the sense of IND-CPA. Based on that, SANN P is semantically secure enough to apply in practice. We assume that Server is semi-honest, and Owner and Client are fully trusted. If IND-CPA is satisfied, whenever VOLUME 6, 2018
answering a query q, SANN P guarantees the followings: 1) Server cannot disclose the original dataset D, and 2) Server cannot learn anything about the query q. According to the requirements of IND-CPA, there exists an adversary who can obtain encrypted subset E(SD i ) for any SD i . In this strengthened assumption, the adversary aims to distinguish E(SD i ) from E(SD j ) through cryptographic deduction where SD i = SD j . In other words, when an adversary challenges on SD i and SD j for their encrypted form E(SD i ) and E(SD j ), challenger responds to it with SD b where coin b ∈ {i, j}. The adversary aims to guess b = i or b = j. The adversary's advantage Adv A of winning the game is defined as
Definition 2 (IND-CPA Secure): In polynomial time, if there is no adversary A breaking the partition method with a non-negligible function Adv A , the partition method is IND-CPA secure.
In the following sections, we propose an SANN P model with a greedy partition method that strictly follows the requirement of Definition 2. Moreover, we theoretically prove that our greedy partition method satisfies IND-CPA secure in Appendix I.
III. PARTITION
In this section, we address the first challenge we described in Section II-B. In offline preparation of SANN P , a map index I and all encrypted subsets are produced. To achieve that, we propose an optimized linear order, based on locality sensitive hashing (LSH) which has theoretical guarantee of the ANN result accuracy. Based on that, a greedy partition method is proposed to partition the whole dataset.
A. VARIANT LOCALITY SENSITIVE HASHING
Before presenting our partition method, we briefly introduce an variant version of LSH. Indeed, the original LSH is a fundamental concept that is widely adopted in state-ofthe-art linear order mapping and ANN schemes for highdimensional data [9] . Formally, the variant version of LSH h : R d → Z 2 λ maps a d-dimensional vector into a single integer as also introduced in [14] .
In Equation 1, v is the original d-dimensional vector. The inner product is y(v) = α · v, in which α is a vector randomly drawn from a 2-stable Gaussian (normal) distribution defined by the density function f (x) = (1/ √ 2π )e −x 2 /2 . Note that, we define = (max p∈D {y(p)} − min p∈D {y(p)}) · 2 −λ and r is drawn randomly from [0, ].
Definition 3 ((R 1 ,R 2 ,P 1 ,P 2 )-Sensitive LSH [9] ): Given for each i = 1 to λ do 5: for each j = 1 to m do 6: The i−th bit of h j is added into C; 7: end for 8: end for 9: return C; 10: end function
In the above definition, the values of P 1 and P 2 are calculated as follows:
In practice, a group of LSH functions (as Definition 4) are always adopted together [21] , [22] .
For convenience, the G value of vector v is represented as
B. LINEAR ORDER
To construct a linear order, H q is mapped into a single binary code C q following z-order style [22] . The first bits of h vi are placed at the beginning of C v when 1 ≤ i ≤ m, and then the second bits are placed at the next positions. The process repeats until the last bits are placed. For example, assuming m = 2, λ = 3 and H 1 = (h 11 , h 12 ) = (001, 011), the code of v 1 is C v = (000111). Such method is called LSH-based coding as shown formally in Algorithm 1.
Obviously, given C = {C v |v ∈ D}, C, ≤ is a linear order set where ≤ is bitwise comparison between two codes. In this way, we break the limitation of the linear order defined in [21] . Assume that p 1 = (2.5, 2), p 2 = (3, 2.5) and p 3 = (2, 5) are three original data in D, and two LSH functions in G function with α 1 = (7, 1), r 1 = 0, ω 1 = 11.5 and α 2 = (2, 6), r 2 = 0, ω 2 = 5.5 are defined as:
It is obvious that p 2 is closer to p 1 than p 3 in Euclidean space. According to Definition 4, H 1 = (1, 3), H 2 = (2, 3) and H 3 = (1, 6) are G values of p 1 , p 2 and p 3 respectively. Obviously, according to ≤ H [21] , H 3 is closer to H 1 rather than H 2 . Therefore, pairwise distance between LSH keys is not well preserved under ≤ H . However, in our linear order, H 1 , H 2 and H 3 can be further mapped into C 1 = (000111), C 2 = (001101) and C 3 = (010110). Notably, C 2 is closer to C 1 in the linear order rather than C 3 . It is consistent to our observations in original data.
So far, a linear order in C is built. Based on that, two vectors are close enough to each other if their codes are equal or close enough.
C. GREEDY PARTITION METHOD
A natural way is to partition the whole dataset according to codes of data like in Fig. 2 . However, it is inadequate for partitioning by the codes since there are still several limitations:
1) The perpendicular bisector between two adjacent codes is incomputable and meaningless. 2) When partition dataset into subsets with equal-number codes, it leads to data explosion.
To address the limitations mentioned above, we use the exact codes of the critical vectors as the upper and lower bounds. Several principles during the greedy partition method are as follows:
P1 All data sharing the same code must be gathered into the identical subset and the size of subset should be minimized. P2 Size of each subset should be uniform without leading to data explosion. P3 Upper and lower bounds for each subset are independent and unique.
P1 ensures less communication cost and shorter average response time, because all vectors sharing the query's code are the query's ANNs with equal probability. To achieve P2, we gather equal-number vectors into a single subset instead of gathering remaining vectors with the same code into different subset. Meanwhile, according to P3, the map index I is derived from the vectors which is only included in current subset. Note that, P1 is for accuracy guarantee since most probable nearest neighbors are in the same partition. P2 provides security guarantee in the basis that encrypted partitions are of unique size, and hence are indistinguishable from each other. P3 ensures the feasibility of map index by avoiding a query falling in multiple subsets.
The greedy partition method is generally illustrated in Fig. 3 and formally described by Algorithm 2. To facilitate the following discussion, we define
The main partition algorithm is formally described in Algorithm 2. Dataset D[] is the input. D[] is sorted at the beginning (Line 2). I is initialized to be empty and partition width w is greedily computed (Line 3). The partition starts from the first element in dataset (Line 4). Then, a loop is carried out to continuously partition datasets (Lines 5-14). In the loop, w continuous elements are first added into a subset (Line 7), and then only the equal-code sets that are completely included in the subset are indexed (Lines 8-10). Following that, the index item I i are generated by embedding another random tag t i (Lines 6, 11-13). Finally, the array of subsets SD[] and map index I are returned (Line 15). 
Algorithm 2 Greedy Partition Algorithm
Sort D[] by their codes according to < C, ≤>;
3:
i ← 1, j ← 1; /* i and j are the subscripts of subsets and elements, respectively. */ 
Generate t i by a PRG, and I i ← I i,u , I i,d , t i ; 13: I = I I i ; 14: until j > n; 15: return SD[], I []; 16: end function An helpful example of such partition method is also described in detail in Appendix II.
Consequently, by applying P3, the upper and lower bounds for each subset are independent. Hence, the subsets may be overlapped slightly. However, it hardly exert any negative impact on the query efficiency. It's mainly because the number of overlapped vectors is small enough to be ignored, which will be justified by experiments in Section VI-D.
IV. SANN P
In this section, we'll discuss how an arbitrary query is performed under SANN P framework, in order to address the second challenge proposed in the end of Section II-B.
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Afterwards, the security, accuracy and complexity of SANN P are analyzed.
A. CONSTRUCTION OF SANN P 1) PREPARATION
Owner carries out Preparation offline before subcontracting dataset to Server. First of all, security parameter SP should be set, which includes a random secret key sk, a G m function comprising m modified LSH functions based on Equation 1, and an appropriate λ for the single code length. In this way, a secret parameter is formed as SP = sk, G m , λ .
At the beginning, all vectors in D are encoded using Algorithm 1, and sorted in ascending order. We then divide D into nop subsets according to Algorithm 2, and nop can be derived from SD[]. With the map index I of SD[], each subset SD i is associated with a random tag t i ∈ Z by a pseudo random generator (PRG). Hence,
Since database cannot be stored securely as clear text, Owner chooses an IND-CPA secure encryption algorithm E. Afterwards, Owner encrypts SD i using E with the private key sk, and obtains E(
Whenever Client issues a query q, the following procedures are performed sequentially.
2) QueryTag
Client requests SP and I from Owner, and encodes q according the G m function selected in Preparation. Then Tag Query Algorithm (Algorithm 3) is executed to obtain a cloak query T , which comprises of a set of tags t i . Each tag corresponds to the subset in which the ANN result may fall.
In Algorithm 3, T and C I are initialized to be empty (Line 1). C I is constructed by sequentially connecting all upper and lower bounds (Line 2-4). Then, C q is computed (Line 5). Afterwards, we locate subsets in which the ANN result of q falls and add the corresponding tags to T (Line 6-11). Finally, T is generated (Line 12). T is then sent to Server as the cloak query.
3) Search@Server
One of the greatest strengths in SANN P is that it avoids the complicated and expensive operations in Server, such as similarity (distance) computation in [17] , retrieval of a large set of tags in [18] , comparisons of encrypted codes [14] , etc.
When resolving a cloak query T , Server returns the result
In practice, Server stores E( SD i ) with file name t i . Thus, when Server receives a cloak query T , he just sends the content of file t i back to Client without any extra operation. Even if such mechanism is not adopted, in the worst case, E( D) can be managed using a low efficiency linear list. The cost to locate the returning subsets E( ) is O(nop) where nop n D .
Algorithm 3 Tag Query Algorithm
Require: Index I , a query q Ensure: A cloak query T 1: T = ∅, C I = ∅; 2: for each i = 1 to nop do 3: 
Once the result E( ) is returned to Client. Client decrypts each E(SD i ) ⊆ E( ) with secret key sk to get . Then, sequential scanning over is the kNN result.
Notice that Server does not know D, SD i , or which are all encrypted. Thus, Owner's data are confidential as long as the secret key is secure. q, C q and I are never leaked to Server. In this manner, Server will learn nothing about the query or the candidate set. More theoretical studies over this scheme are given in the following.
B. SECURITY ANALYSIS
The security of SANN P relies on IND-CPA secure encryption algorithm.
Theorem 1: Given that the encryption algorithm adopted is IND-CPA secure, the greedy partition method is IND-CPA secure with respect to a single query. (The proof is in Appendix I-A)
The security guarantee presented above only considers an adversary for a single query with power to obtain a large number of plain-cipher pairs. This assumption is equivalent to that in [23] , in which access pattern and search pattern are divulged inherently. For multiple queries, the distribution of Client's queries (i.e., search pattern and access pattern) can be obtained by adversary, and adversary can rebuild the relation between the tags and ranges of each encrypted subset. In order to reduce such security risk, the partition width should be large enough so that the distribution is meaningless. Indeed, there is no outstanding work to expound the meaning of distribution over high-dimensional data. Even so, through the proof of Theorem 1, the partition width should be large enough to guarantee the security. When the size is equal to 1 or other small values, the proposed SANN P becomes weak and thus inefficient and impractical. Hence, such mechanism should avoid a small size of subset.
Indeed, access pattern is meaningless for a single query but very meaningful for multiple queries. Along with multiple queries, it leads to inferring information by exploiting the correlation between different queries. SANN P inherently does not achieve protection of access pattern as be proved. Generally, if access pattern is leaked, it will lead to huge private information leakage. For example, in GIS system, the user's location commonly contains private information and is regarded as the access pattern to submit. If the history of location is leaked, we can facilely infer that the user is in company, since company is the place user visited most frequently. Another applications (e.g., biometric information, multimedia feature, etc.) face the analogical problems. A general method for providing security of multiple queries is to apply private information retrieval (PIR) [24] protocol, or oblivious transfer (OT) [25] protocol. How to achieve protection of access pattern is beyond this paper. Hence, we only explain the approach of adopting PIR in our proposed SANN P concisely.
In general, PIR protocols allow Client fetching an encrypted subset while preventing Server from knowing it under limited computing resource. Client issues a specific set of fake queries and the true query. Then, Server returns all encrypted subsets corresponding to the specific set. Client only picks up the encrypted partition corresponding to the true query. Throughout the process, Server will not know which subset Client picks up. However, due to PIR protocol, the security guarantee would come at cost, and the communication efficiency will be too bad in practice. How to design an SANN or SNN that both protects access pattern and provides high query efficiency is still an open problem. Thus, the tradeoff between security and efficiency should be seriously considered according to the specific applications.
C. ACCURACY ANALYSIS
Similar to LSH-based ANN, the proposed SANN P also exhibits satisfactory accuracy guarantee which is derived by Definition 3. In this part, we present theoretical analysis over the accuracy of SANN P .
Theorem 2: Given p, v ∈ R d , and p is the vector close to
where min = min
where max = max 1≤i≤m { i }. The proof of theorem is referred to [14] . According to Equation 3 , given two different vectors q, v ∈ R d , if q − v > R β then C v = C q never happens if m is large enough. That means, if C v = C q occurs, the probability of q − v ≤ R β occurring is high. In SANN P , the ultimate goal for Server is to return the set with the same code of q. Theorem 2 assures that the close vectors of q are in with a great probability.
D. COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS

In this part, complexity analysis is conducted for
Then, given a query q, Client performs QueryTag to get T . Let Finally, Client receives the encrypted candidate set E( ), then performs Dec step, and get the candidate set . Let n = #( ) which is 2w at most. Then, kNN is run to find the close vectors to query vector q in . The complexity of searching reduces to O(n ) from O(n D ). n D is always 1-3 magnitudes larger than n under appropriate settings of m and λ.
V. MULTI-DIVISION SANN P
For a single G m function, according to Theorem 2, there is a limitation: the smaller the subset is, the lower the result accuracy is.
In fact, for two vectors who are very close in D, there is a non-negligible probability that they do not share the same code under a single G m function. In order to overcome the limitation and improve the accuracy, we introduce a multidivision strategy into SANN P and propose mSANN P .
A. CONSTRUCTION OF MULTI-DIVISION SANN P 1) MULTI-PREPARATION
Owner carries out Preparation offline times before subcontracting dataset to Server, where is the number of divisions adopted. The secret parameter is mSP = ∪ j=1 SP j .
For SP j , the encrypted outsourced dataset is E( D j ) = 
2) MULTI-QueryTag
When Client issues a query q, he requests mSP and mI from Owner. Then, Client encodes q according to the VOLUME 6, 2018 G j m function selected in Multi-Preparation where j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , }. Client executes Algorithm 3 to obtain a single cloak query T j for D j . Hence, in mSANN P , the final cloak query is mT = ∪ j=1 T j .
3) MULTI-Search@Server
Whenever receiving a query request, Server performs Search@Server times for each E( D j ) with T j , and returns E(m ) = ∪ j=1 E( j ) to Client as the response, where
4) MULTI-Search@Client
Before carrying out kNN over m , an authorized Client gains access to secret key sk j from Owner. Client decrypts all the vectors in E(m ) and removes all repeat ones. Then, sequential scan is performed to find kNNs in the remaining vectors.
B. ANALYSIS OF MULTI-DIVISION SANN P
It is obvious that there is no additional secure concerns in mSANN P other than SANN P . Thus, mSANN P is as secure as SANN P with respect to a single query. Analysis of accuracy and complexity follows on. Server carries out Preparation offline times independently. As a result, the probability that two close vectors in R d collide in C is at least
where P α 1 and P α 2 are the probabilities that they collide in G 1 m and G 2 m , respectively. In fact, the result accuracy increases with the increase of . Experimental results justify that in next section.
Similar to accuracy analysis, time and space complexity of mSANN P is times that of SANN P . In compensation for the limited sacrifice in time and space costs, accuracy reaches a much higher level compared to other solutions.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We conduct the experiments in C++ on a Workstation with Intel Xeon CPU E5-2680 v2 @ 2.80 GHz and 256 GB memory running Linux. We use MIRACL 2 library to implement all the standard encryption schemes.
We perform our experiments on two real datasets (Hong-Kong 3 and SIFT1M ) 4 and two synthetic datasets (Gaussian64, Gaussian256) with different dimensionalities. Hong-Kong consists of 1,384,420 2-dimensional POIs (Point of Interest) in Hong Kong, China. SIFT1M consists of 1,000,000 128-dimensional sift descriptors. We generate 1,000,000 64-/256-dimensional vectors following Gaussian distribution for Gaussian64 and Gaussian256, respectively. Moreover, 10,000 vectors in each dataset are generated for testing.
All four datasets are normalized before being processed. Let a vector in dataset be p i = (x i1 , x i2 , . . . , x id ) . The normalized parameter is as follows:
Through all experiments, AES symmetric encryption is adopted as the secure encryption algorithm. It will guarantee the confidentiality of data against Server. The encryption process is independent of our partition method. Hence, a series of other symmetric and asymmetric encryption methods can also be adopted, such as DES, IDEA, RC4, RSA, ECC, IBE, etc. Additionally, Client does not release the cache of ever decrypted elements to promote searching efficiency.
To justify the empirical results, we compare accuracy and efficiency of our work (i.e., SANN P and mSANN P ) with three baseline state-of-the-art SANN approaches. Among these approaches, DCQR [18] was proposed for 2-dimensional data, and SANN T [17] was proposed for multi-dimensional data. The security they considered is weak for aforementioned application scenarios in Section I, which is enhanced in our proposals. The only scheme, which reaches the same secure level as SANN p and mSANN p , is SNN proposed in [1] . However, as we will mention in related work, SNN cannot resolve SANN in 2-dimensional data, and thus it is not considered as a baseline approach. Here, RS-SANN_MI in [14] is introduced because of the excellent performance on ratio. All the parameters in the above three schemes are optimized according to their instructions.
In the following, we introduce the measures for evaluating the accuracy and efficiency of experiments. Afterwards, we discuss how the algorithm parameters are optimally selected. Following that, we show the comparisons between our schemes and the three state-of-the-art approaches, DCQR, SANN T and RS-SANN_MI, to demonstrate the superiority of our schemes. Finally, we show the additional properties and advantages of our work that none of other approaches provide.
A. MEASURES
The following measures are employed to evaluate the performance for all schemes:
• ratio is used to evaluate the accuracy of returned results.
For n q test queries q i with their k close vectors o ij , where 1 ≤ i ≤ n q and 1 ≤ j ≤ k, k vectors o * ij for q i are returned as search results. ratio is defined as follows:
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• ART @Server is used to evaluate Average Response Time (ART) of search scheme for Server. For n q test queries q i and 1 ≤ i ≤ n q , Server needs st i to find . ART @Server is defined as follows:
• ART @Clent is used to evaluate ART of search scheme for Client. For n q test queries q i and 1 ≤ i ≤ n q , Client needs ct i to do Search@Client step in . ART @Clent is defined as follows:
• ART is used to evaluate the integral ART for both Server and Client. ART is defined as follows:
B. PARAMETER SELECTION
In our schemes, several key parameters need to be considered: the number m of LSH functions, the length λ of a single code and the times to repeat query processing which is only valid in the mSANN P model. All these parameters should be selected appropriately. In the following, we perform experiments to test the effects of these parameters, and find optimal values. Note that λm is the total length of code. Let m be fixed. Larger λ excludes more true negative vectors in a single subset. Hence, with the increase of λ, partition size decreases and it leads to the decrease of accuracy. We vary λ for the four datasets and pick up those which give best tradeoffs between true negative and ratio. We fix λ = 8 for Hong-Kong, and λ = 2 for Gaussian64, SIFT1M and Gaussian256.
In all figures shown in this section, the tick marks in X-axis appear as the form ''a/b/c/d'', where a,b,c,d correspond to the value in Hong-Kong, Gaussian64, SIFT1M and Gaussian256 dataset, respectively. For instance, in Fig. 4 , the second x-tick ''4/7/15/9'' means that m = 4 for Hong-Kong, m = 7 for Gaussian64, m = 15 for SIFT1M and m = 9 for Gaussian256.
1) EFFECT OF m
We vary m to test how the performance is affected in Fig. 4 . As expected, when m increases, SANN P results in a smaller partition size because of a smaller number of vectors sharing the same code. Therefore, ratio decreases while ART increases. The tradeoff between accuracy and ART must be weighed carefully for different applications.
In SANN P model, there is no effective strategy to improve ANN results' accuracy in only a single candidate set while there is plenty time to process more returned vectors. In order to provide the availability of ANN result, ratio is strictly restricted to a lower level and ART is relaxed to an acceptable 
value (≈ 10 ms).
It is worthwhile to improve accuracy by sacrificing time. We fix m = 8 for Hong-Kong, m = 6 for Gaussian64, m = 15 for SIFT1M and m = 8 for Gaussian256 to achieve better ratio. Consequently, it will take a longer time to find the ANN result.
The multi-division query strategy in Section V significantly improves the accuracy. Hence, a lower accuracy for a single partition does not lead to a lower accuracy in mSANN P . Instead, ART increases linearly along with the increase of and it leads to an unacceptable response level. Here, we make a strict restriction (≈ 1 ms) to ART and experimental results show that it is very worthwhile to promote efficiency by sacrificing accuracy (notably, the accuracy guarantee gets back through the multi-division strategy). We make a sound tradeoff by fixing m = 12 for Hong-Kong, m = 11 for Gaussian64, m = 25 for SIFT1M and m = 11 for Gaussian256. In consequence, though seemingly reduced, the accuracy will be eventually improved by multi-division strategy.
2) EFFECT OF
Note that is only valid in mSANN P model. Here is a tradeoff between accuracy and ART which is selected according to the customized requirement. By fixing m, it is easy to see that = 3 for Hong-Kong dataset achieves higher accuracy and satisfactory ART in Fig. 5 . We set the parameter in other datasets in the same way, = 11 for Gaussian, = 9 for SIFT1M and = 6 for Gaussian256.
Up to now, we have selected the appropriate values of parameters. All the selected values are listed in Table 3 , based on which the following experimental studies are conducted. 
C. RESULTS COMPARISON
In this part, we compare DCQR, SANN P , mSANN P and RS-SANN_MI with SANN T on the four datasets. In SkNN outsourcing applications, there are 5 widely-investigated measures, i.e., ratio, ART , ART @Server, ART @Client and storage space [1] , [16] , [22] . We adopt these measures in concentrated SANN outsourcing applications, and all processes in this section are done without encryption for fairness. Within the comparison, we vary k ∈ [1, 100], the number of returned neighbors. The vectors in datasets are normalized into [0, 1] according to the normalization function in the beginning of Section VI.
ratio. Fig. 6 shows the performance of ratio when we vary the values of k. Note that, SANN P and mSANN P outperform other three schemes. The ratios can be guaranteed because that SANN P and mSANN P scan several partitions which include more vectors than those of other three approaches.
The ratio of SANN P and mSANN P decreases as k increases. Their differences between DCQR and SANN T decreases as k increases too. That indicates our models return the best results when k is small. Moreover, it is important in the motivated applications, where the number of returned nearest neighbors is limited. There are two remarkable phenomenons in Fig. 6 . Firstly, when adopting multi-division strategy in mSANN P , ART further decreases with the same level of ratio as shown in Fig. 7 . Secondly, mSANN P outperforms SANN P and DCQR a lot for Hong-Kong. That means LSH outperforms other methods in 2-dimensional ANN.
ART . We present the comparison on ART between four schemes in Fig. 7 . The ARTs of both SANN P and mSANN P are much less than those of DCQR and SANN T . In general, SANN P outperforms other methods with the lowest ratio shown in Fig. 6 , because SANN P needs the shortest time to find kNN over the candidate set. It is contrary for Gaussian64 which will be explained in the following.
Although, mSANN P adopting multi-division strategy may intuitively leads to an increase in ART . However, as illustrated in Fig. 11 , mSANN P needs to access fewer vectors than SANN P . The reason is that the sizes of subsets in SANN P and mSANN P are completely different, and SANN P needs to enlarge partition size w (roughly equals to 2% ∼ 5% of #(D)) to ensure the accuracy of the ANN result, while the partition size in mSANN P for a single table structure is always 1 magnitude smaller than that in SANN P . The total number of vectors which mSANN P accessed is smaller than that of SANN P . Hence, mSANN P has a better performance in ART as shown in Fig. 7(b) .
It is worth noting that the highest cost for RS-SANN_MI comes from two aspects. The first is that RS-SANN_MI accesses encrypted data as many as mSANN P does as shown in Fig. 11 . The second is that we do not adopt caching decrypted data in RS-SANN_MI and it results in repeated decryption of the same element in dataset. However, we emphasize that the absent of caching in RS-SANN_MI does not put essential effect on the efficiency because of the equivalent of data access volume as shown in Fig. 11 . Indeed, the comparisons of encrypted codes in RS-SANN_MI take most of the computation cost.
In a word, mSANN P achieves an optimal tradeoff between ratio and ART . Note that ART consists of ART @Server and ART @Client which are illustrated in the following.
ART @Server. The comparisons on ART @Server are shown in detail in Fig. 8 . In general, our approaches outperform the others. At server side, SANN P exhibits the best ART by returning only one candidate set. mSANN P returns multiple candidate sets for promoting ratio and leads to an increase in ART . Even so, as both SANN T and DCQR need similarity computation at server side, SANN P and mSANN P provides much better ART than SANN T , DCQR and RS-SANN_MI. The highest cost for RS-SANN_MI is due to the computation cost of the adopted comparable encryption, which is expensive than other computation at server side.
ART @Client. The comparisons on ART @Client of all schemes are shown in Fig. 9 . Note that there is no time cost at client side for DCQR, so it is absent in Fig. 9(a) . In general, our approaches perform worse than others, because we shift computational burden from Server to Client. At client side, SANN T and DCQR have better ARTs by returning only kNN results. SANN P /mSANN P returns 1/multiple candidate set(s). SANN T and DCQR provide better ARTs than ours at client side, but they cannot recover original data from the returned data, which is not applicable to scenario described in Section I.
1) SPACE COMPLEXITY
The comparisons on space complexity of outsourced datasets and map index I are shown in Table 4 . For index, the unit is the size of integers. For data, the unit is the size of floats. Our models occupy the most and the least storage space for data and index respectively. Since query speed at server side is only determined by the scale of index, our schemes have the best ART @Server as shown in Fig. 8 .
For data space, without considering data compression (it goes beyond this research), SANN P takes a small space to store encrypted data. Both DCQR and SANN T take even less spaces because they cannot recover original data from subcontracted data. mSANN P takes the most space but provides the highest accuracy as shown in Fig. 6 . Moreover, to improve the efficiency in mSANN P , adopting clouds to perform Search@Client times is a reasonable approach(it goes beyond this research too).
Experimental results show that our approaches achieves better results on ratio and ART while preserving confidential of data compared to other solutions. Thus, our schemes are practical and exhibit many advantages when applied to high confidential scenarios.
D. OTHER PERFORMANCE
Both SANN P and mSANN P are proved secure with respect to a single query, which is not satisfied in DCQR or SANN T . In this section, we evaluate other performance measures which do not exist in the other solutions. 
1) DECRYPTION TIME
In both SANN P and mSANN P , after receiving encrypted E( ) and E(m ), Client first decrypts them and conducts kNN over and m . The decryption process affects the efficiency of the whole solutions. Decryption time for different datasets is shown in Fig. 10 . Notably, there is a significant increase in decryption time from 2-dimensional data to 64-dimensional data. However, it tends to be almost constant when dimensionality is over 64. The light increasing of decryption time from Gaussian64 to Gaussian256 comes from the significant reduction of ratio shown in Figure 6 . Indeed, we can lower decryption time by increasing ratio. Hence, our approaches exhibit good scalability.
2) DATA ACCESS VOLUME IN D
This measure reflects the real distance computation scales of and m for ANN results at client side. It also reflects the communication cost because all the involved data should be transmitted to Client from Server. By varying k, data access volume is invariable because we restrict the volume of each subset to be much larger than k. In Fig. 11 , it is obvious that the overlapping of subsets does not effect the efficiency of the proposed SANN P and mSANN P , and data access volumes for all datasets reach a sound level. Fig. 1 exemplifies the functionality of SANN P . There are two types of sensitive data, Client's query and Owner's dataset. Both data face different secure challenges, which are extensively discussed in latest works. We divide all these works into two categories, unidirectional transformationbased solutions and bi-directional transformation-based ones. We investigate both groups of solutions in the following.
VII. RELATED WORK
A. UNIDIRECTIONAL TRANSFORMATION
This group of solutions focus only on providing confidentiality of query and dataset by unidirectional transformation, which means original data cannot be recovered from outsourced data. Transformation-based SANN (SANN T ) [16] , [17] was proposed based on product-quantization codes (PQcodes). In these works, original metric is transformed into a fast-compute approximate distance based on PQ-codes.
Whenever Client submits a query q, PQ-code of q is sent to Server, and Server conducts kNN on PQ-codes of dataset. In [17] , by confiscating the codebook, Server cannot transform PQ-codes of q back into q and therefore q is protected against disclosure. In [16] , combining both symmetric and asymmetric metrics for PQ-codes, the confidentiality of query and dataset is provided.
DCQR, as a kNN with privacy protection method, was proposed in [18] for 2-dimensional data. Both query and data are transformed into H-values from Hilbert curves. Whenever Client submits a query q, H-value of q is sent to Server, and Server conducts kNN on dataset's H-values and sends back the result's H-values to Client.
Although the aforementioned approaches are effective to protect the privacies of query and dataset, they suffer from two limitations. Firstly, these approaches cannot be theoretically proved to be IND-CPA secure. Secondly, in all these approaches, Client cannot recover original data from the outsourced datasets. Hence, it is not applicable to the realworld applications as shown in Section I.
B. BI-DIRECTIONAL TRANSFORMATION
This group of solutions additionally provide inverse transformation from outsourced data to recover original data. Wong et al. [3] developed an asymmetric scalar-product-preserving encryption and constructed two secure schemes that support secure kNN (SkNN). Similarly, Hu et al. [26] proposed a secure traversal framework and an encryption scheme based on privacy homomorphism. These works are fundamental in secure multimedia data management, but they are proved to be insecure in [1] . Yao et al. [1] focused on secure nearest neighbor (SNN). They proposed a secure search framework by Voronoi diagram based partition. When the dimensionality of data is greater than 2, Voronoi diagram becomes too complicated to perform partition on. Additionally, Choi et al. [27] proposed the first SkNN solution with IND-OCPA security for only 2-dimensional elements. Therefore, these approaches are not applicable in high-dimensional data management such as the real-world scenarios in Section I.
Elmehdwi et al. [2] focused on solving SkNN problem over relational database subcontracted to the cloud. The framework includes two non-colluding semi-honest clouds, while only single cloud is invoked in Fig. 1 . Although a secure squared Euclidean distance (SSED) is proposed based on an additive homomorphic and probabilistic asymmetric encryption scheme (i.e., Paillier cryptosystem), SSED is too expensive for large-scale high-dimensional data to achieve. Kuzu et al. [28] proposed a secure similar search scheme, which focuses on several real applications in nonEuclidean space, such as fault-tolerant typographical, similarity search in the text information, etc. There are two main drawbacks which leads to be inapplicable for our scenarios: 1) The returned candidates cannot be guaranteed for either amount or quality of nearest neighbors; 2) The proposal is a mechanism with multi-rounds of communication, which raises security concern and reduces efficiency. Peng et al. [14] proposed a concrete SANN based on comparable encryption and achieved high efficiency. It owns fragile security because of the inherent drawback of comparable encryption so far. Zhu et al. [15] 's scheme focused only on data privacy and resolved the key sharing problem which is outside this paper. However, it does not provide rigorous security proof of data security or query security. In a word, these approaches are not applicable in scenarios showed in Section I.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed SANN P and mSANN P based on greedy partition method. First of all, a linear order of vectors in dataset is defined based on sortable characteristic of LSHbased codes. Two adjacent vectors in linear order are close to each other with a great probability. Afterwards, a greedy partition method is adopted to divide dataset into several encrypted subsets with different random tags. Through a carefully designed map index, Client first judges which subset the query falls in and then gets the corresponding cloak query. Whenever Client conducts a query, only a few subsets will be returned. Hence, the communication cost is reduced to O(n ) which is much smaller than O(n D ). Some theoretical results are also elaborated to illustrate effectiveness and security of the proposed schemes.
Meanwhile, extensive experiments are carried out with MIRACL library. Comparison results show that ratio of our models are much better than other three state-of-the-art solutions, DCQR, SANN T and RS-SANN, while ART in our schemes are less than that in others. In a word, SANN P and mSANN P provide a balance between accuracy and average response time, satisfy provable secure which is not satisfied in others, and are scalable for high-dimensional data. As part of future work, we will extend the framework to secure range query, promote efficiency for location-based services, subcontract the index to Server, etc.
APPENDIX I PROOFS OF THEOREMS
In this appendix, we present all the skipped proofs of theorem through the main body in detail.
A. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Proof: There are 2 parts to be proved: 1) Server cannot disclose the original data D; 2) Server cannot learn anything about q. We prove the two parts respectively.
Proof of the First Part: In this part, we must provides security for the encrypted subset in the sense that no matter how much vectors are included in each subset. That means, Server cannot learn any piece x i of data in the subset. Existing works assume that such premise is correct [1] . We here discuss such assumption in detail by inductive proof.
The adopted encryption scheme is IND-CPA secure, which is generally proved by reduction in previous works. That means if there exists an attacker A breaking the encryption algorithm, A's advantage is Adv A ≤ where is a negligible function. Obviously, while each subset contains only a single piece of data, the security relies on the security of adopted encryption algorithm. Hence, the advantage of adversary in breaking SANN is Adv 1 ≤ while #(SD 0 ) = #(SD 1 ) = 1 and SD 0 = SD 1 . Adv 1 is a negligible function.
Then, supposing that Adv i ≤ τ ( ) when #(SD 0 ) = #(SD 1 ) = i and SD 0 = SD 1 , Adv i ≤ τ ( ) is proved when #(SD 0 ) = #(SD 1 ) = i + 1 and SD 0 = SD 1 . Here τ ( ) and τ ( ) are both negligible function of . Hence, the theorem can be proved by mathematical induction method. Recall that, SD 0 and SD 1 share the same size as stated in P2 in Section III-B. Therefore, in each step of inductive proof, the sizes of SD 0 and SD 1 are the same to each other.
Let #(SD 0 ) = #(SD 1 ) = i and Adv i ≤ τ ( ). For #(SD 0 ) = #(SD 1 ) = i+1, SD 0 = SD 0 ∪q 0 and SD 1 = SD 1 ∪q 1 . If q 0 = q 1 , then it is obvious that Adv i+1 ≤ τ ( ) which is negligible. If q 0 = q 1 , the challenge is divided into two sub challenges. The first sub challenge is on SD 0 and SD 1 , and the second one is on q 0 and q 1 . For the first sub challenge, Adv f ≤ τ ( ).
For the second one, Adv s ≤ . Once the adversary wins the first sub challenge or the second one, the adversary wins the game. Therefore, Adv i+1 = τ ( ) = max{Adv f , Adv s } ≤ max{τ ( ), }, which is still negligible. Finally, the adversary's advantage of distinguishing E(SD 0 ) and E(SD 1 ) is negligible.
By mathematical induction, the advantage of A is a negligible function. So, the encrypted subset is IND-CPA secure by adopting an IND-CPA secure encryption algorithm regardless of how much vectors are included in each subset. Furthermore, for any two subsets E(SD a ) and E(SD b ) with the same size, an adversary can query for the two decrypted subsets SD a and SD b simultaneously. The adversary still cannot determine plain-cipher pair E(SD a ), SD a or E(SD b ), SD b with any non-negligible probability. Hence, Server cannot learn anything about the original data D.
Proof of the Second Part: Whenever a query q is submitted, a cloak query T is transmitted to Server where T consists of several random tags generated by a PRG. There is no association that can be inferred between the tags, the code boundaries and the plaintext of corresponding subsets. When an adversary captures a tag t i , he cannot recovery the query q or even determine any reasonable range regarding to q's codes. Thus, the adversary can learn something about q if and only if he breaks the PRG. Hence, Server cannot learn anything about q, since the PRG is non-fragile.
In a word, with respect to a single query, the greedy partition method is IND-CPA secure as long as the encryption algorithm adopted is IND-CPA secure.
B. PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Proof: In Multi-Preparation phase, Server carries out Preparation offline times independently. Thus, selections of secret keys and G m functions for each Preparation are completely independent. Hence, an adversary cannot infer any effective correlation between different subsets.
The greedy partition method is proved to be IND-CPA secure in Theorem 1. In addition, an adversary can only infer correlation inside a single partition but nothing else. Hence, mSANN P exhibits the same property as that in SANN P .
APPENDIX II EXAMPLE OF GREEDY PARTITION METHOD
We exemplify the greedy partition method as shown in Fig. 3 where the size of dataset is #(D) = 17. Different style triangles indicate that only a fixed number of vectors share the same corresponding code as shown in the legend. Here, C p 1 = C p 2 = C 1 , C p 3 = C p 4 = C p 5 = C 2 , etc.
Before partition, the vectors in D are sorted ascendingly based on the predefined linear order C, ≤ . Let the partition width be w = max 16 ) are allocated to SD 6 while all the codes of these three elements are not included in I 6 .
